Cases for Prelims

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Agustin vs. Edu

Facts
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue delegation of police power.

Issue
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional


Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the streets and highways

Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

Facts: Petitioner, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Army and Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces, was charged before a military commission set by Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the Philippines. Said executive order also established a National War Crimes Office and prescribed rules and regulations governing the trial of accused war criminals. Petitioner contended that E.O. No. 68 was illegal and unconstitutional because he cannot be tried fro violation of international conventions, like the Geneva and Hague Conventions. Furthermore, he alleged that the participation of two American lawyers in the prosecution was violative of our national sovereignty.

Issue: Whether the Philippine Government has the jurisdiction to try and convict Kuroda for violating prohibited acts of the war.

Held: Executive Order No. 68 is legal and constitutional because Article II, Section 3 of the 1935 Constitution explicitly provides that “the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of nation.”

In promulgation and enforcement of E.O. No. 68, the President of the Philippine exercised his power as commander-in-chief of all armed forces. Moreover, it was in adherence with the generally accepted principles and policies of international law which form part of our Constitution.

With regards to the contention about the participation of two American lawyers, the Philippines was under the sovereignty of the United States and thus, we were equally bound together with the US and Japan, to the rights and obligations contained in the treaties. These rights and obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty.

Jeffrey Liang (Huefeng) vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.

Issues:

The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity which is only preliminary considered enforceable? and was the petitioner's right to due process violated?

Rulings:

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.³ The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.⁴ It appears that even the government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.⁵ As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.

Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.⁶ Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.⁷ The rule on the criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.⁸ Besides the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.⁹

Secretary of Justice vs. Judge Lantion GR 139465

Facts

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 “Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country” and the established “Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America”, the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty.
The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available.


Issue

1.Whether or not private respondent, Mark B. Jimenez, be granted access to the official extradition request and documents with an opportunity to file a comment on or opposition thereto
2.Whether or not private respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty


Ruling

The Supreme Court ruled that the private respondent be furnished a copy of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to give him a reasonable period of time within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. In this case, there exists a clear conflict between the obligation of the Philippine Government to comply with the provisions of the treaty and its equally significant role of protection of its citizens of its right of due process.
The processes outlined in the treaty and in the presidential decree already pose an impending threat to a prospective extraditee’s liberty as early as the evaluation stage. It is not an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very imminent one. On the other hand, granting due process to the extradition case causes delay in the process.
The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in good faith. The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
In this case, there is no conflict between international law and municipal law. The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens. In fact, neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes the rights of due process from a prospective extradite.

Tanada vs. Angara

Facts : This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue : Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Held: In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda – international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.

Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the “concept of sovereignty as autolimitation.” What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.